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ABSTRACT
We first critique the manner in which work costs have been introduced into labor supply estimation, and
note the difficulty of incorporating a realistic rendering of the costs of work. We then show that, if work
costs are not accounted for in the budget and time constraints in a structural labor supply model, they
will be subsumed into the data generating preferences. We show that even if underlying preferences
over consumption and leisure are convex, the presence of unobservable work costs can make these
preferences appear nonconvex. Absent strong functional form assumptions, these work costs are not
identified in data commonly used for labor supply estimation. However, we show that even if work costs
cannot be separately identified, under plausible conditions, policy relevant calculations such as estimates
of the effect of tax changes on labor supply and deadweight loss calculations, are not affected by the fact
that estimated preferences incorporate work costs.
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In empirical studies, economists typically assume that preferences are convex. Convexity
of preferences yields a number of simplifying results, among them single valued demand
functions. As a result, estimation often begins by positing a simple functional form for a
demand function, without being too concerned about the underlying preference relation that
generates the demand function. Further, as long as the estimated demand function satisﬁes
Slutsky negativity and symmetry, one is guaranteed that there exists a convex preference
ordering consistent with such a demand function.1 Thus, making the assumption of convex
preferences greatly simpliﬁes any estimation procedure.
In most economic applications, the assumption of convex preferences is innocuous. When
budget sets are linear, the choice behavior of an individual with nonconvex preferences is
identical to the choice behavior of an individual with convex preferences that are created
by convexifying the nonconvex indiﬀerence curves. As a result, no economically meaningful
part of the indiﬀerence curve is lost by assuming that preferences are convex.
When budget constraints are nonlinear, however, all parts of preferences can become
economically meaningful. When budget constraints are nonlinear and convex, for example,
there are nonconvex preferences for which utility can be maximized on the interior of the
convex hull of an indiﬀerence curve.2 Hence, in this setting, a convexiﬁed indiﬀerence curve
d o e sn o ty i e l dt h es a m ec h o i c eb e h a v i o ra st h en o n c o n v e xi n d i ﬀerence curve, and so one
cannot assume that preferences are convex without ruling out some choice behavior.
In spite of this, in structural labor supply estimation in the presence of nonlinear budget
constraints, the assumption of convex preferences has been invoked in virtually all estima-
tion methods. For example, in the various local linearization methods, the assumption of
convex preferences is used to reduce the entire labor supply decision down to a marginal
decision that is determined by the after tax wage and nonlabor income associated with the
budget constraint segment on which the individual is observed.3 In Hausman (1985), convex
preferences yield a computationally easy method of identifying the utility maximizing point
on the nonlinear budget constraint, and facilitate the straightforward setup of the likelihood
function.4 Finally, the method proposed in MaCurdy, Green and Paarsch (1990), strictly
convex preferences yield an implicit function that can be used to solve for optimal hours
on a diﬀerentiable approximation to the budget constraint as a function of the stochastic
elements, which is then inverted and used as an argument in the likelihood function.5
As we argue in Heim and Meyer (2002), a possible reconciliation of the ﬁndings in pre-
vious studies, which often found estimates of labor supply parameters either inconsistent
(or constrained to be consistent) with economic theory, is that the data used in the various
1See Hurwicz and Uzawa (1971).
2It is easy to verify, however, that if the budget constraint is nonlinear and concave, then utility cannot be
maximized on the interior of the convex hull of an indiﬀerence curve. Essentially, in a labor supply setting,
maximization on the interior of the convex hull may occur on portions of the budget constraint in which the
after tax wage decreases as hours increase, and not when the after tax wage increases as hours increase.
3See Hall (1973) for an explanation of this.
4For an explanation of the Hausman method, see Hausman (1985). For a discussion of the use of convexity
in the Hausman method, see the previous chapter.
5See MaCurdy et al. (1990) for an exposition of the MaCurdy method of using a diﬀerentiable budget
constraint to estimate labor supply parameters.
1estimation methods were generated by the maximization of nonconvex preferences on the
nonlinear budget constraint. We further show that the standard methods used to estimate
labor supply in this setting cannot be adapted to allow for the estimation of parameters con-
sistent with nonconvex preferences, and suggest a method that can. Why, then, should one
consider the possibility that preferences may be nonconvex in the setting of labor supply?
One possibility is that underlying preferences over consumption and leisure are noncon-
vex. Preferences that are nonconvex may still satisfy a number of other weaker assumptions,
including being complete, reﬂexive, transitive, continuous, monotonic and locally nonsa-
tiated. It may be that preferences simply do not satisfy convexity, even if they satisfy the
other conditions.
Another possibility is that the time frame over which the data are collected is not suﬃ-
ciently long for convexity of preferences to apply. As noted in Mas-Collel, Whinston, and
Green (1995) and Varian (1992), the standard justiﬁcation for the assumption of convex
preferences is that, even though one may not want to consume two goods together at the
same time, one would prefer a mix of goods over a longer period of time. In the case of
most consumption goods, the time frame necessary for this averaging argument to apply is
probably short; perhaps a week or a month is a suﬃciently long period of time. However,
i nt h ec a s eo fac o n s u m p t i o n - h o u r so fw o r kc h o i c e ,t h et i m ef r a m en e e d e df o rt h ea v e r a g i n g
argument to apply may be quite long, perhaps even a lifetime. As a result, it may be in
the monthly or yearly time frame that is conventionally used in labor supply estimation,
convexity of preferences does not hold.
Finally, in this paper, we show that, even if underlying preferences over consumption
and leisure are convex in the period of analysis, what we call data generating preferences
or observable preferences in a structural labor supply model may be nonconvex, because
they may be composed of more than just an individual’s underlying preferences. This
point derives from the fact that an individual’s consumption and leisure usually cannot be
observed, and so must be inferred from monetary outlays (or income) and hours of work.
As a result, labor supply models are usually written in terms of hours of work and monetary
outlays.
The usual assumption is that all income or outlays are devoted to consumption and
that all non-compensated hours are leisure time. If these assumptions are correct, it is
obvious that if underlying preferences are convex, data generating preferences over monetary
outlays and hours of work would also be convex, and hence the assumption underlying the
aforementioned models would be correct. However, we argue that, in actuality, individuals
face both monetary and time costs of work when making their choice of labor supply, and
that these costs of work vary with the number of hours that the individuals work. These
work costs can be sizable, with time work costs likely comprising the larger share. The
presence of such work costs may, for example, help to explain the bunching of hours at
certain daily, weekly, monthly, and annual levels that is often found in data. Despite this
situation, in structural labor supply estimation, work costs have either been left out of the
model or treated in a simplistic manner.
We show, however, that in making such a simpliﬁcation, data generating preferences
over monetary outlays and hours of work will not simply consist of underlying preferences,
but will also be aﬀected by the shape of these cost of work functions. We then establish
2a necessary condition on the form of the costs of work function, under which observable
preferences will be nonconvex.
We show that, under certain assumptions on the form of underlying preferences, one
can test for the presence of work costs by examining the shape of observable preferences if
work costs satisfy certain shape restrictions. However, what we would prefer is separate
identiﬁcation of utility and costs of work functions, and we show that the component parts
of observable preferences are not separately identiﬁed absent functional form assumptions.
Finally, we show that, despite the lack of separate identiﬁcation of the constituent parts of
observable preferences, deadweight loss calculations, and some policy simulations, may still
be performed.
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we critique the manner in which work costs
have been introduced into labor supply estimation, and note the diﬃculty of incorporating
a realistic rendering of the costs of work. In Section 3, we show that even if one does not
believe that underlying preferences are convex, the presence of unobservable work costs can
make observable preferences nonconvex. In Section 4, we show that, absent functional form
assumptions, separate identiﬁcation of utility and work cost functions in structural labor
supply estimation is not possible. In Section 5, however, we show that, even if work costs
cannot be separately identiﬁed, policy relevant calculations, such as estimates of the eﬀect
of tax changes on labor supply, or deadweight loss calculations, under plausible conditions
are not aﬀected by the fact that estimated preferences incorporate work costs. Section 6
concludes.
2 A Critical Review of Previous Models of Work Costs
The idea that individuals incur some costs while working is not a new one. In fact, several
papers have incorporated costs of work into labor supply estimation. However, the treatment
of costs of work has been relatively simplistic. In most cases, the empirical studies that have
incorporated costs of work have done so by specifying these costs as a ﬁxed cost of working
any positive number of hours.
In the discussion that follows, we review the ways in which work costs have been intro-
duced into various types of empirical labor supply models. This research has found that the
introduction of a ﬁxed cost of work into empirical speciﬁcations has had a marked eﬀect on
estimated parameters. We then argue, however, that the costs of work are not ﬁxed, but
vary in a complex way with the number of hours an individual works. As such, incorporating
only a ﬁxed cost of work misspeciﬁes the decision problem that the individual faces.
2.1 Previous Empirical Work
Beginning with Cogan (1980), Hanoch (1980) and Hausman (1980), several studies have
incorporated time and/or money costs of work into their empirical speciﬁcation. Almost all
of these papers have modelled the costs of work as a ﬁxed cost of entry into the labor force.
Cogan (1981), for example, estimates a maximum likelihood model of labor force par-
ticipation, wages, and hours worked, that incorporates ﬁxed costs of work, but not the tax
3system. Estimating the model on married women, he ﬁnds that the estimated costs of work
are signiﬁcant.
Considering child care costs, Blau and Robins (1988) incorporate child care costs into
the time and money budget constraints of married women. Estimating a multinomial logit
model, they ﬁnd that child care costs signiﬁcantly aﬀect household labor supply. Ribar
(1992) extends Blau and Robins, and ﬁnds that child care costs signiﬁcantly aﬀect the labor
force participation decision of women.
In a discrete choice model of labor supply analyzing the eﬀects of AFDC-UP, Hoynes
(1996) parameterizes the budget constraint that a family would face under various employ-
ment and hours of work combinations for husbands and wives. She then adds monetary
ﬁxed costs of labor market entry to her model, and ﬁnds that they enter signiﬁcantly.
The incorporation of ﬁxed costs into labor supply estimation has also extended to the
piecewise linear budget constraint literature. Fixed costs of working are incorporated in
Hausman’s (1980) study of the labor force participation of women, as well as in Bourguignon
and Magnac (1990). Both of these studies ﬁnd that there are signiﬁcant ﬁxed costs of work.
2.2 Critique of Previous Work Cost Speciﬁcations
As noted above, previous empirical studies have invariably incorporated the costs of work,
if they were incorporated at all, as a ﬁxed cost of labor market entry.
Depending on the time frame which the data cover, a ﬁxed cost of working may be a
reasonable approximation to the actual costs that a worker faces. Cogan (1981), noted
this, and argued that if a lump sum ﬁxed cost speciﬁcation is used, one should use data
corresponding to the frequency in which this ﬁxed cost is incurred. Thus, if one were
estimating a model of the daily choice of labor supply, a ﬁxed cost speciﬁcation might be
plausible, since the costs incurred are plausibly invariant whether one decides to work one
hour or eight. This type of strategy is employed by Blank (1988), who incorporates hourly
and weekly ﬁxed costs of work into her speciﬁcation.
Empirical labor supply studies, however, almost invariably consider a time frame of a
month or longer, and usually use annual data. A consideration of the major components
of the costs of work, including commuting time, transportation costs, costs associated with
the stress of work and the time preparing for and recovering from work, and training costs,
makes explicit that annual work costs likely vary with the number of annual hours worked
in a complex way. As such, if one is using monthly or yearly data, a ﬁxed cost speciﬁcation
will likely not be a good approximation.
Transportation costs are incurred each day of work and take the form of both a monetary
cost (including paying for gas, subway or bus fare, parking and tolls, and so on) and a time
cost (the time to get to and from work each day). The monetary costs may consist of a
ﬁxed cost, and costs linear in the number of days worked, or there may be volume discounts
available (for example, in the purchase of monthly transit or parking passes). The time costs,
on the other hand, are probably roughly linear in the number of days worked. Estimates of
time spent commuting in several countries range from about seven to ten percent of market
work time (Juster and Staﬀord, 1991). Child care and closting costs are likely to be concave
in annual hours worked, but are not as large on average as commuting costs.
4Most jobs also require some form of training, either before taking the job or in an ongoing
manner. In cases in which training is paid for by the employer, the training does not
constitute an explicit monetary expense for the worker6,b u tm a yi n v o l v eat i m ec o s ti f
the time involved in taking classes or doing homework associated with such training is not
compensated. In other cases, the employee must pay for training, in which case both
monetary and time costs are incurred. These costs may be ﬁx e d ,o rm a yv a r yw i t ht h e
number of hours worked.
It is also true that there may be economies to working a schedule similar to other people.
When this is done, car pools may be used, less expensive child care is available, and so on.
This would suggest that costs of work are greater if one works a number of hours away from
full or part time.
Finally, there are large time costs that are incurred in preparing for, and recovering
from, work each day. In addition, there also are likely to be costs of having the additional
responsibilities and complications in one’s life that often come with work. The stress and
emotional costs of work ﬁgure prominently in the psychology and sociology literatures, for
example in Lee and Ashforth (1996) and Morris and Feldman (1996). Further, Hobfoll
(1989) conceptualizes stress as leading to a loss of resources, including time and money.
These types of costs are likely to be large relative to explicit money costs, and it is likely
that these costs are concave in the number of monthly or annual hours that individuals work,
due to the increased ease in dealing with work if one has a daily and weekly routine. The
presence and likely substantial magnitude of such costs also illustrates that a large part of
the costs of work could be thought of as either time costs or aspects of work that are more
commonly thought of as a feature of preferences. Thus, conceptually it is hard to distinguish
time costs of work from preferences.
Thus, both time and monetary work costs are substantial, and time work costs seem
to be large. In addition, in contrast to previous renderings of the costs of work, it seems
clear that work costs vary with the number of monthly or annual hours an individual works.
Furthermore, since portions of work costs may also be linear or concave functions of the
number of days or weeks that an individual works, it is likely that a ﬁxed cost speciﬁcation
is a bad approximation when monthly or yearly labor supply is being studied.
A more complex form of work costs may also help to explain the bunching of hours
that is often found in survey data. If work costs were simply a ﬁxed cost, and individuals
preferences were convex over all positive annual hours of work, then we would expect there
to be little bunching around any particular level of hours7. However, there tends to be
noticeable amount of bunching of the data around certain levels of hours. For example,
in the data used in Hausman (1981), there is considerable bunching around 2000 annual
hours and 40 weekly hours. Among other things, the presence of work cost that vary with
the number of hours that an individual works may help to explain why individuals tend to
choose certain levels of hours on a daily, weekly, monthly, and annual basis.
6Though the worker often implicitly must pay for the training in the form of lower wages.
7Except, perhaps, around convex kinks in budget constraints due to the structure of the income tax. How-
ever, this type of bunching is often not pronounced, and thus cited as the reason for including measurement
error in a stochastic speciﬁcation when using the Hausman method to estimate labor supply parameters.
See, for example, the discussion in Blundell and MaCurdy (1999), p. 1633.
52.3 Infeasibility of Explicit Incorporation of the Costs of Work
Clearly, given the above discussion, incorporating only a ﬁxed cost of work when the time
frame under analysis is a month or more assumes away the complex manner in which the
costs of work vary with the number of hours that a person works. Explicitly characterizing
the complex form of these costs in structural estimation of labor supply would clearly be
desirable. In what follows, however, we note that many practical problems make this
approach infeasible.
To illustrate this point, suppose that individuals faced only monetary costs of work, and
that a researcher knew the form of the cost of work function, which will be denoted F1(h),
where h denotes the number of hours the individual works8. Let the individual’s after tax
budget constraint, ignoring the costs of work, be a function of their gross wage, W,t h e i r
nonlabor income, Y , and the number of hours they work, h. D e n o t et h i sb u d g e tc o n s t r a i n t
as f(W, Y,h).L e t t i n g C denote consumption, the individual’s actual budget constraint,
when both the tax system and work costs are incorporated, is thus
C + F1(h) ≤ f(W,Y,h). (1)
Letting w denote the net wage and y denote virtual income associated with a segment of a
nonlinear budget constraint, given a speciﬁcation for a labor supply function, h(w,y),a n d
under the assumption that preferences are convex, one could in theory construct the budget
constraint above for each individual in the data, and use an already existing method to
estimate labor supply parameters in the presence of nonlinear budget constraints.
In practice, however, such an approach will run into data limitations. Although most
monetary costs of work described above are theoretically observable, very few of the surveys
commonly used for labor supply estimation collect data about work costs, and none ask
questions about all of the possible components of work costs.
Furthermore, the above discussion only considers the monetary costs of working. We
expect that time costs of work incurred by individuals are more important than monetary
costs. If we denote the time costs of working as F2(h), the individual’s time constraint is
now
L ≤ H − F2(h) − h, (2)
where L denotes leisure and H is the time endowment. Explicitly characterizing these costs
r e s u l t si na ne v e nm o r ec o m p l i c a t e db u d g e tc o n s t r a i n ta n de v e nm o r ed i ﬃcult data problems,
since it is especially unlikely that accurate data can be collected on the some of the time
costs of work, like the time required to prepare for or unwind from work.
Hence, it is clear why most labor supply speciﬁcations have only incorporated a ﬁxed
cost of work, or have ignored work costs completely. However, work costs do exist, and in
the next section we show that if work costs are not accounted for in the budget and time
constraints, then the assumed data generating preferences in such an approach will not be
the maximization of the individuals’ underlying preferences over consumption and leisure
8This setup is generalized to a case in which individuals have a choice among various modes of transporta-
tion, child care, and so on, with each mode having its own time and money cost schedules, in Appendix B.
In this case, the results that follow generalize to this setting if one replaces F1 (h) and F2 (h) with F1 (O,h)
and F2 (O,h), respectively, and makes straightforward changes to each of the propositions.
6subject to the tax law generated budget constraint, but will rather be the maximization of
those preferences augmented by the work cost functions. We then show that the preferences
that result will likely be nonconvex, and explore the implications of this on the choice of an
estimation method.
3 How Work Costs Can Make Preferences Appear Non-
convex
In the previous section, we argued that if the costs of work vary with the number of hours an
individual works, then the budget constraint generated by the tax tables does not represent
t h ea c t u a lb u d g e tc o n s t r a i n tt h a tw o r k e r sf a c e ,a n di n c o r p o r a t i n go n l yaﬁxed cost into an
estimation procedure will be inadequate.
In this section, we demonstrate that, although work costs would customarily be accounted
for in the budget and time constraints, for any maximization problem of utility over con-
sumption and leisure, subject to budget and time constraints that incorporate work costs,
there exists an equivalent maximization problem in which a function over monetary outlays
and hours of work, which incorporates underlying preferences over consumption and leisure
and time and money work costs, is maximized subject to the statutory budget constraint.
We will refer to this function as a composite utility function, and to the preferences it repre-
sents as observable preferences. This result implies that if one estimates preferences using
only tax tables to specify the budget constraint, but that individuals actually face time
and/or monetary work costs when choosing hours of work, then one is thus attempting to
estimate data generating preferences with the costs of work incorporated therein.
We then examine what conditions on the costs of work will lead observable preferences to
be nonconvex. It turns out that, given the variety of possible shapes for the costs of work,
nonconvexity of observable preferences is plausible. Thus, if one is using tax tables to specify
the budget constraint, one must be careful about the assumptions that one makes about the
form of the utility function, and allow for the possibility that preferences are nonconvex.
3.1 Incorporation of Work Costs into Utility Functions
In this section, we show that every utility maximization problem in which work costs are
factored into the budget and time constraints has an equivalent formulation where these
work costs are subsumed into observable preferences, and for which the optimal hours choice
is the same.
First, let O denote total monetary outlays, the sum of outlays on the composite consump-
tion good and costs of work. The following proposition demonstrates that given a problem
in which the consumer maximizes utility over consumption and leisure subject to a budget
constraint that incorporates tax laws and monetary costs of work, and a time constraint
that incorporates time costs of work, there exists a problem involving the maximization of a
composite utility function over outlays and hours of work that incorporates preferences and
time and monetary work costs subject to only the tax law generated budget constraint, and
for which the optimal hours of work is the same.
7Proposition 1 For every consumer problem in which a utility function, U(C,L),i sm a x -
imized subject to an arbitrary budget constraint that incorporates monetary costs of work,
F1(h), and a time constraint that incorporates time costs of work, F2(h), there exists an
equivalent problem in which a composite utility function, e U(O,h), that incorporates prefer-
ences and time and monetary work costs is maximized subject to only the budget constraint,
and for which the optimal hours choice is the same.
Proof. Consider a consumption - leisure choice problem subject to a general budget con-
straint that incorporates money costs of work, and an hours constraint that incorporates




s.t. C + F1(h) ≤ f(W,Y,h,θ)
h + F2(h)+L ≤ H,
where θ denote tax parameters, and all other variables are as deﬁned previously.
Deﬁne O ≡money outlays≡ C +F1(h).U s i n gC = O −F1(h), and substituting the time
constraint in for L, we can rewrite (3) as
max
O,h
U(O − F1(h),H − h − F2(h)) (4)
s.t. O ≤ f(W,Y,h,θ).




s.t. O ≤ f(W, Y,h, θ).
Since the problems are equivalent, if (C∗,L ∗) solves (3), then (O∗,h ∗),w h e r eO∗ =
C∗ + F1(h∗) and h∗ + F2(h∗)=H − L∗, solves (5).
The above proposition also holds if the worker faces only monetary (or only time) costs
of work. To see this, simply set F2(h) (or F1(h))t o0.
The setting in the proposition above is clearly a simpliﬁed one, in which F1 (h) and F2 (h)
are exogenous to the workers choice, whereas workers obviously have some choices to make
regarding how they get to work, what type of training they take, what form of child care
their children receive, and so on. However, in Appendix A, we present a generalization of
this proposition, in which individuals can choose among various modes of transportation,
child care, and so on, with each mode having its own time and money cost schedules.
The following proposition demonstrates that the converse of the above proposition is also
true, that for any problem in which a consumer maximizes a composite utility function, which
incorporates preferences and time and monetary work costs, subject to a tax law generated
budget constraint, there exists an equivalent problem in which the consumer maximizes
utility over consumption and leisure subject to a budget constraint that incorporates the
tax laws and monetary costs of work, and a time constraint that incorporates time costs of
work, and for which the hours choice is the same.
8Proposition 2 For every consumer problem in which utility over outlays and hours of work
that incorporates the time and money costs of work, e U(O,h), is maximized subject to a budget
constraint, there exists an equivalent problem in which utility over consumption and leisure,
U(C,L), is maximized subject to a budget constraint that incorporates monetary costs of work
and a time constraint that incorporates time costs of work, and for which the hours choice
is the same.




s.t. O ≤ f(W, Y,h, θ).
Using that O = C + F1(h),a n dL = H − h − F2(h),d e ﬁne g(h)=F2(h)+h.T h e n
H − L = g(h)= ⇒ h = g−1(H − L). Thus, (6) now becomes
max
C,L,h
e U(C + F1(g
−1(H − L)),g
−1(H − L)) (7)
s.t. C + F1(h) ≤ f(W,Y,h,θ)
L = H − h − F2(h).
Deﬁning U(C,L)=e U(C + F1(g−1(H − L)),g−1(H − L)) yields the result.
Since the problems are equivalent, if (O∗,h ∗) solves (6), then (C∗,L ∗),w h e r eC∗ =
O∗ − F1(h∗) and L∗ = H − h∗ + F2(h∗),s o l v e s( 7 ) .
Since these two maximization problems are equivalent, an individual maximizing their
underlying utility function subject to budget and time constraints that incorporate work costs
can also be viewed as maximizing a composite utility function which subsumes those work
costs, subject only to a tax law generated budget constraint. As such, a data generating
process involving the maximization of preferences subject to budget and time constraints
that incorporate work costs, has an equivalent data generating process in which individuals
maximize observable preferences which subsume the work costs, subject only to a tax law
generated budget constraint.
Further, if some work costs are observable and accounted for in the budget constraint,
and other work costs are unobservable, it is a simple extension of the propositions above to
show that if the budget constraint is speciﬁed using the tax law generated budget constraint
and the observable work costs, then the unobservable work costs will be incorporated into
the estimated preferences.
These results are analogous to a result in Feenstra (1986) in showing how some element of
an individual’s budget constraint could be equivalently viewed as aﬀecting the individual’s
preferences, or vice versa. In that paper, Feenstra demonstrates that a model in which
real money balances are an argument of the utility function is functionally equivalent to a
model in which liquidity costs enter into the budget constraint. Similarly, Fuhrer (1990) and
others have argued that habit formation in consumer expenditures can be modeled in terms
of preferences or in terms of costs of adjustment that are reﬂe c t e di nab u d g e tc o n s t r a i n t .
Thus, if individuals are actually maximizing utility in the presence of at least partially
unobservable work cost functions, but one estimates a structural model under the assumption
9that the data were generated by individuals maximizing utility subject only to the tax law
generated budget constraint, then the data generating preferences would comprise both the
underlying preferences and the work cost functions. As a result, estimation can proceed by
specifying only the tax law generated budget constraint (and observable work costs, if any)
and estimating the composite utility function. In eﬀect, all of the known variables are used
to construct the budget constraint, and the unknown preference and work cost parameters
are all subsumed into estimated preferences.
H o w e v e r ,o n em u s tb ea w a r eo ft h ef a c tt h a t ,i nd o i n gs o ,w o r kc o s tf u n c t i o n sw i l li n -
deed be subsumed into the estimated preferences. Further, since the shape of observable
preferences are aﬀected both by the shape of underlying preferences and by the shape of
work cost functions, any characteristic of the observable preferences (such as nonconvexity
or nonmonotonicity) could have resulted from the properties of any of the component func-
tions. This aspect of the propositions presented above is similar in spirit to a result in
Browning (1997), which shows that intertemporally nonadditive behavior could result either
from nonadditivity in the budget constraint or nonadditivity in preferences.
Two main issues arise when specifying an estimation method that allows work costs to
be subsumed into estimated preferences. First, one must be careful about the speciﬁcation
of heterogeneity used. To see this, suppose that there is heterogeneity in tastes for work,
denoted by vi, as well as heterogeneity in money work costs, denoted by ωi1,a n di nt i m e
work costs, denoted by ωi2. The individual’s problem, then, is
maxU (C,L,vi) (8)
s.t. C + F1 (h,ωi1) ≤ f(W,Y,h,θ)
h + F2(h,ωi2)+L ≤ H.
Using the technique in Proposition 1, this may be rewritten as
maxU
¡
O − F1 (h,ωi1),H − h − F2(h,ωi2),v i
¢
(9)
s.t. O ≤ f(W,Y,h,θ).
Depending on the assumptions one wishes to make about the joint distribution of vi, ωi1,
and ωi2, one may need to use a more complex stochastic speciﬁcation than the two error
speciﬁcation that has been widely used in studies like Hausman (1981), Blomquist and
Hansson-Brusewitz (1990), Triest (1990), and many others.
Second, the question occurs as to what eﬀect the incorporation of the work costs into
preferences will have on the shape of such preferences. We show in the next section that the
resulting preferences may very likely be nonconvex. As such, one should be reticent about
making the assumption that preferences are convex when implementing such an estimation
method.
3.2 Nonconvexity of Observable Preferences Due to Work Costs
In this section, we demonstrate that when work costs are subsumed into observable prefer-
ences, those preferences will likely be nonconvex.
The following proposition demonstrates a necessary condition on the monetary and
time costs of work functions for observable preferences to be nonconvex. Let outlays
10be O = C + F1(h),w h e r eF1(h) denotes the monetary costs of work. Let leisure be
L = H − h − F2(h),w h e r eF2(h) denotes the ﬁxed time costs of work. Finally, let U(C,L)
represent underlying convex preferences over consumption and leisure, and e U(O,h) represent
observable preferences over outlays and leisure, where e U(O,h)=U(O−F1(h),H−h−F2(h))
Proposition 3 Strict concavity of either F1(h) or F2(h) over some range of h is a necessary
condition for observable preferences e U(O,h) to be nonconvex.
Proof. Suppose not, that F1(αh+(1−α)h0) ≤ αF1(h)+(1−α)F1(h0) and F2(αh+(1−α)h0) ≤
αF2(h)+( 1− α)F2(h0) for all h0 6= h and α ∈ [0,1], but that e U(O,h) is nonconvex. Then





aO +( 1− α)O0 − F1(αh +( 1− α)h0),
H − (αh +( 1− α)h0) − F2(αh +( 1− α)h0)
¶
. (11)
Since F1(αh+(1−α)h0) ≤ αF1(h)+(1−α)F1(h0) and F2(αh+(1−α)h0) ≤ αF2(h)+(1−
α)F2(h0), and U(C,L) is monotonic in both arguments, we have
≥ U
µ
a[O − F1(h)] + (1 − α)[O0 − F1(h0)],
α
£








By the quasiconcavity of U(C,L),
≥ min
½
U(O − F1(h),H − h − F2(h)),
U(O0 − F1(h0),H − h0 − F2(h0))
¾
(13)
=m i n {e U(O,h), e U(O
0,h
0)}. (14)
Hence e U(O,h) is quasiconcave, observed preferences are convex, and we have a contradiction.




αO +( 1− α)O0 − F1(αh +( 1− α)h0),





U(O − F1(h),H − h − F2 (h)),
U(O0 − F1(h0),H − h0 − F2 (h0))
¾
. (16)
Essentially, this condition requires that F1(h) or F2(h) be suﬃciently concave for observable
preferences, e U(O,h), to be nonconvex.
If one further makes the assumption that all functions are continuous and twice dif-





















≤ 0,( 1 7 )
11where Ui denotes the partial derivative of U with respect to its ith argument. To interpret
this, under the assumption that underlying preferences are monotonic and convex, we know
that U1 and U2, as well as the entire last term, are positive. Hence, the suﬃcient condition
amounts to requiring that the second derivatives of either or both of the work cost functions
be suﬃciently negative so that the sum of the ﬁrst two terms is larger in absolute value than
the ﬁnal term.
To assess the plausibility, then, that observable preferences are nonconvex, recall the
discussion of the components of the costs of work in the previous section. These work
costs vary in a complex manner with the number of hours worked, and may be concave in
the number of hours, or even decrease over a range of hours. Thus, given the conditions
above, it seems plausible that observable preferences over outlays and hours of work will
exhibit nonconvexities. As a result, if one uses a method that relies on the assumption
that preferences are convex while specifying the budget constraint as the budget constraint
resulting from tax laws, then the model is likely misspeciﬁed.
In Heim and Meyer (2002), we examine the likely result of such a misspeciﬁcation, in
which the estimation method (such as that in Hall (1973), Hausman (1981), or MaCurdy et
al. (1990)) relies on the assumption that preferences are convex, but that data generating
preferences are actually nonconvex. We speculated that if one of these methods is used in
the presence of such a misspeciﬁcation, then the estimated parameters may exhibit wrongly
signed compensated wage eﬀects. Since compensated wage eﬀects were either wrongly signed
or constrained to be of the correct sign in a number of studies (See, for example, MaCurdy
et al. (1990), Blomquist and Hannson-Brusewitz (1990), Colombino and Del Boca (1990),
and Triest (1990)), it may be that not taking account of the complex form of costs of work
in the estimation method led to the perplexing results in these studies.
As a result, if using the tax law generated budget constraint in a structural labor supply
model, as often is necessary, one should be reticent about using a method that relies on the
assumption that preferences are convex, and instead use a method that can estimate para-
meters consistent with both convex and nonconvex preferences. In Heim and Meyer (2002),
we showed that all of the usual methods of estimating labor supply parameters, including
local linearization, the Hausman method, and the MaCurdy method, cannot be modiﬁed to
allow for the estimation of observably nonconvex preferences, and suggest methods that may
be applied in this case.
4D i ﬃculty of Separately Identifying Work Costs from
Underlying Preferences
Given the results above, if one does not explicitly account for costs of work in the budget
constraint when estimating labor supply preferences, then the estimation method must at-
tempt to estimate preferences that incorporate both the underlying preferences and the costs
of work function.
It may be argued, then, that if work costs are not observed, the proper strategy is to
jointly estimate utility and work cost functions. In this section, we analyze the wisdom of
this approach. We ﬁrst examine, if we make the assumption that underlying preferences
12satisfy certain properties, whether we can successfully test for the presence of work costs by
examining whether observable preferences violate these properties. It turns out that only
when work cost functions satisfy certain shape restrictions will such a test for the presence of
work costs have power. We then show, however, that those shape restrictions do not deliver
joint identiﬁcation of all of the component functions of the observable preferences, even when
additional shape restrictions are placed on the work cost functions. Hence, identiﬁcation of
the work cost functions will come from functional form assumptions. Thus, such a strategy
may greatly complicate the estimation procedure, while only yielding tenuous estimates of
preferences and work costs.
Formally, assume that underlying preferences are continuous, monotonically increasing,
and convex. Let these preferences be represented by the utility function U(C,L) ∈ Θ1,w h i c h
contains all continuous, monotonically increasing in both arguments, quasiconcave functions
that represent unique preference orderings. Similarly, in the absence of time costs of work,
these preferences could be represented by the utility function U(C,H − h)=b U(C,h) ∈ Θ2,
which contains all continuous, quasiconcave functions that are monotonically increasing in
the ﬁrst and decreasing in the second argument. In the presence of monetary and time costs
of work, F1(h) and F2(h) respectively, let observable preferences be represented by e U(O,h)=
U(O−F1(h),H−h−F2(h)). The following propositions demonstrate the conditions on F1(h)
and F2 (h) under which e U(O,h) / ∈ Θ2, and so, under the above assumptions on underlying
preferences, a test for the presence of work costs by examining the properties of the observable












for some C, L,a n dh,w h e r eL = H −h−F2(h),t h e na
test for the presence of costs of work F1(h) and F2(h) will have power, due to the violation
of monotonicity in h.
Proof. Suppose not. Then
∂ e U(O,h)



































Hence, under certain conditions on F1(h) and F2 (h), a test for the presence of costs of
work will have power, because observable preferences will not satisfy monotonicity. The
following corollary establishes a necessary condition for a test for the presence of work costs












for all C, L,a n dh,w h e r eL = H −h−F2(h),t h e ns t r i c t
concavity of either F1(h) or F2(h) over some range of h is a necessary condition for a test
for the presence of work costs to have power due to the violation of convexity of e U(O,h).
13Proof. Suppose not. Applying Proposition 3 yields that e U(O,h) is quasiconcave, and so a
test for the presence of F1(h) and F2(h) will have no power.
Following the discussion in the previous section, the suﬃcient condition for a test for the
presence of work costs to have power is for the condition in (16) to hold (or, if functions are
twice diﬀerentiable, for the condition in (17) to hold), which again amounts to the costs of
work functions being suﬃciently concave (or for their second derivatives to be suﬃciently
negative).
Hence, under the assumption that the utility function, U(C,L), is continuous, monotonic
in both arguments, and quasiconcave, the costs of work functions, F1(h) and F2(h),m u s t
satisfy certain shape restrictions in order for the above described test for their presence to
have power. We now show, however, that the assumption that preferences are continuous,
monotonic and convex does not result in joint identiﬁcation of the utility and costs of work
functions, even if one places some additional shape restrictions on the costs of work function.
Suppose preferences are continuous, monotonically increasing, and convex. Let these
preferences be represented by the utility function U(C,L) which is an element of the set
Θ, which contains all continuous, monotonic, quasiconcave functions that represent unique
preference orderings. In the presence of monetary and time costs of work, arbitrary function
F1(h) and F2(h) which are element of the set of all functions Ω, observable preferences are
represented by U(O − F1(h),H − h − F2(h)).
Proposition 5 G i v e nd a t ao no u t l a y s ,O, hours of work, h, and individuals’ budget con-
straints, the utility function, U(C,L), and costs of work functions, F1(h) and F2(h),a r e
unidentiﬁed in Θ and Ω, respectively.
Proof. Consider ﬁrst a utility function U(C,L) and work cost function F1(h) and F1(h),
so that observable preferences are U
¡
O − F1(h),H − h − F2(h)
¢
.N e x t , l e t φ1, φ2, φ3
and φ4 be scalars such that 0 <φ 2 + φ3 < 1 and φ2 + φ4 > 1, and deﬁne U0(C,L)=

















h . We need to verify that that observable preferences are equiv-




2(h) ∈ Ω. Clearly, since Ω is the set of all
functions, the last condition is satisﬁed. Next, note that observable preferences in the two






























O − F1(h),H − h − F2(h)
¢
.
Further, the two utility functions represent diﬀerent preferences, since U0 is not a strictly
increasing transformation of U. So, it remains to show that U0(C,L) is monotonically in-
creasing in both arguments and quasiconcave.
First, ∂U0
∂C = U1 ≥ 0,w h e r eUi denotes the derivative of U with respect to the ith argument.
14Second, ∂U0
∂L =[ φ2 + φ3]U2,S i n c e φ2+ φ3 > 0,t h e n∂U0
∂L > 0, and hence monotonicity is
established.
Finally, take C0 6= C, L0 6= L and note that for all α ∈ [0,1],
U





[αC +( 1− α)C0]+φ1,





α[C + φ1]+( 1− α)[C0 + φ1],
α
£










Since U(C,L) is quasiconcave,
≥ min
½
U(C + φ1,φ 2L − φ3(H − L)+φ4H),
U(C
0 + φ1,φ 2L









Hence, U0(C,L) is quasiconcave. Thus, ∃ U




2(h) ∈ Ω such that
observable preferences are the same, and hence U(C,L), F1(h),a n dF2(h) are unidentiﬁed
in Θ and Ω, respectively.
Hence, although we can test for the presence of costs of work if we make some assump-
tions about the shape of the utility function, those assumptions alone do not deliver joint
identiﬁcation of the utility and costs of work functions.
Further, note that assuming F1 (h) and F2 (h) are increasing and/or concave also does not
yield identiﬁcation. To see this, note that if F1 (h) and F2 (h) satisfy these shape restrictions,
F
0
1 (h) and F
0
2 (h) also satisfy these, and the rest of the proof follows. Other shape restrictions
might yield joint identiﬁcation, but the imposition of such restrictions would be ad hoc, since
given the above discussion of the components of the costs of work, few plausible restrictions
can be placed a priori on the shape of this function. In practice, then, if work costs are
unobservable, any separate identiﬁcation of preferences and work costs will likely come from
functional form assumptions.
It would seem, then, that since preferences and work costs are not separately identiﬁed
in estimation, that if work costs are unobservable, the usual policy analyses could either
not be performed, or would be so sensitive to speciﬁcation as to render them meaningless.
However, in the next section, we show that one can estimate the composite utility function
without making any eﬀort to separate out preferences from work costs, and still perform
many policy relevant calculations.
5 Irrelevance of Composition of Estimated Preferences
to Some Policy and Welfare Analyses
Given the previous propositions, the question arises whether not being able to separately
identify preferences and costs of work functions will have an eﬀect on certain policy analyses.
15Clearly, if costs of work are not separately estimated, some calculations cannot be performed,
such as examining the labor supply eﬀects of implementing a tax credit for child care costs.
In this section, however, we show that the inability to reliably estimate the work cost
functions separately from pref e r e n c e sd o e sn o tp r e c l u d eu sf r o mm a k i n gs o m eo ft h em o s t
common policy relevant calculations. Namely, we show that the results of the most common
policy and welfare calculations are invariant to whether the shape of estimated preferences
arises solely from the shape of underlying preferences, or some amalgamation of underlying
preferences and work costs. Further, these results hold whether or not estimated preferences
are nonconvex.
The key to these propositions is that the proposed policy change must not aﬀect the
shape of the work cost functions. As such, work costs must not be treated diﬀerently in the
tax code than consumption (or leisure time).9
Suppose, ﬁrst, we are interested in the eﬀect of a change in the tax law generated budget
constraint, from f (W,Y,h,θ1) to f (W,Y,h,θ2), on an individual’s labor supply. Using the
notation of Section 3, consider an estimated (possibly composite) utility function e U (O,h),
which may consist of work costs subsumed into observable preferences, or may consist solely
of underlying preferences. Let h1 be the hours of work that maximize this function on the
budget constraint f (W,Y,h,θ1),a n dh2 be the hours that maximize this function on the
budget constraint f (W,Y,h,θ2). Note that, given Proposition 1, the hours that maximize
underlying utility on the two budget constraints would be h1 and h2, respectively, regardless
of whether e U (O,h) consists solely of preferences, or consists of preferences augmented by
work costs. Hence, the estimate of the labor supply eﬀect of the change in the tax generated
budget constraint is the same in either case. As a result, given estimates of e U (O,h),w e
can proceed to examine the eﬀect of such a policy change as if the estimated preferences
consisted solely of underlying preferences.
In the rest of this section, we show that even if work costs are not separately identiﬁed,
deadweight loss calculations may also be performed, again with the caveat that work costs
must not be treated diﬀerently than consumption (or leisure time) in the tax code. Namely,
the following subsections demonstrate that the calculation of the deadweight loss of an
income tax that does not aﬀect work costs is invariant to whether preferences have monetary
or time work costs contained within them, even in the presence of progressive or other
nonproportional taxation. As such, we can proceed to make the deadweight loss calculation
as if estimated preferences consisted solely of underlying preferences.
5.1 Proportional Tax Case
In this section, we demonstrate that the calculation of deadweight loss due to a proportional
tax on labor income is invariant to whether the shape of the estimated indiﬀerence curve
arises out of the individual’s underlying preferences, or due to the presence of some costs of
work.
First, consider a case in which observable possibly nonconvex preferences over consump-
tion and leisure are represented by the utility function U(C,L), which in the absence of costs
9One should also note that we are assuming there are no general equilibrium eﬀects of the tax policy
change, or the tax code, that change the magnitude of work costs.




. Second, consider another case
in which the underlying preferences over consumption and leisure are represented by b U(C,L).
However, suppose that due to monetary costs of work, F1(h),a n dt i m ec o s t so fw o r kF2 (h),
we observe preferences b b U(O,h),w h e r eb b U(O,h)=b U(O−F1(h),H −F2 (h)−h). Finally, let
U(a,b)=b b U(a,b), so that both sets of observable indiﬀerence curves over O (which equals
C in the absence of time costs) and h have the same form, and hence are observationally
equivalent if we cannot observe the costs of work.
The following proposition demonstrates that, under a proportional tax, the deadweight
loss of the tax is invariant to whether the observed shape of the indiﬀerence curve is due to
underlying preferences, or due to work costs being incorporated into underlying preferences
to yield the observable preferences.
Proposition 6 The deadweight loss from imposing a proportional tax, t, on an individual
with possibly nonconvex preferences U(C,L),w h i c hm a yb er e p r e s e n t e di nt h ea b s e n c eo f




, equals the deadweight loss from imposing a pro-
portional tax, t, on an individual with underlying preferences b U(C,L) and possibly nonconvex
observable preferences b b U(O,h)=b U(O − F1(h),H − F2 (h) − h),w h e r eU(a,b)=b b U(a,b).
Proof. See Appendix B.
For a sketch of the proof, consider Figures 1 and 2, which illustrate these propositions in
the presence of monetary work costs. Figure 1 demonstrates the calculation of deadweight
loss when the underlying preferences are nonconvex. In this case, the leisure the individual
consumes is L∗
0, which corresponds to working hours h∗
0, and the unearned income required
to be able to aﬀord this point is e(W(1 − t),u 0)=C∗
0 − (1 − t)Wh∗
0.I f t h e t a x w e r e n o t
in place, the individual could have reached the same level of utility with unearned income
e(W,u0)=e C0 − We h0. The amount of income tax the government collects is R = tWh∗
0,
and hence the deadweight loss of the income tax is
DWL0 = e(W(1 − t),u 0) − e(W, u0) − R (25)
=[ C
∗









In Figure 2, the indiﬀerence curve is only observably nonconvex because of the presence
of the costs of work. However, the observable indiﬀerence curve, b b U(O,h),i se x a c t l yt h e
same shape as in the previous ﬁgure. Thus, the individual consumes the same amount of
leisure, L∗
1 = L∗
0, and works the same number of hours h∗
1 = h∗
0. Consumption is lower
in this ﬁgure, but the total amount of outlays in this ﬁgure, O∗
1 = C∗
1 + F1(h∗
1),e q u a l st h e
amount of consumption in Figure 1, C∗
0.
So, to calculate the deadweight loss in this case, we ﬁr s tn o t et h a ta tt h eo p t i m a l




1. If the tax were not in place, the individual could
have reached the same level of utility with unearned income e(W,u0)=e C1 +F1(e h1)−We h1.
T h ea m o u n to fr e v e n u et h a tt h eg o v e r n m e n tc o l l e c t si sR = tWh∗
1, and so the deadweight
loss of the proportional tax in this ﬁgure is
17Figure 1: Graphical Demonstration of Proposition 6 - Nonconvex Inherent Preferences



























1, e O1, h∗
1,a n de h1 in Figure 2 are the same amounts as C∗
0, e C0, h∗
0,a n de h0,
respectively, in Figure 1, the two deadweight losses are the same.
Thus, if we calculate the deadweight loss explicitly accounting for the fact that observable
preferences have work costs embedded within them, we get the same quantity as when we
calculate deadweight loss using a utility function whose indiﬀerence curves have the same
shape. As such, given estimates of preferences that may or may not subsume work costs,
we can proceed calculating the deadweight loss as if the estimated preferences consist solely
of underlying preferences.
5.2 Nonproportional Tax Case
The result in the previous subsection also applies to the nonproportional tax case, in that
the deadweight loss calculation is invariant to the source of the shape of indiﬀerence curves.
18Figure 2: Graphical Demonstration of Proposition 6 - Nonconvex Observable Preferences
Following the notation in the previous subsection, consider a case in which observable
possibly nonconvex preferences over consumption and leisure are represented by the utility
function U(C,L), which may also be represented by U (C,h). Second, consider another
case in which, the underlying preferences over consumption and leisure are represented by
b U(C,L). However, suppose that due to monetary costs of work, F1(h),a n dt i m ec o s t so f
work, F2 (h), we observe preferences b b U(O,h),w h e r eb b U(O,h)=b U(O−F1(h),H−F2 (h)−h).
Further, let b b U(a,b)=U(a,b),s ot h a tb o t hs e t so fi n d i ﬀerence curves over O and h have the
same form, and hence are observationally equivalent if we cannot observe the costs of work.
Finally, suppose income is taxed with a nonproportional tax schedule deﬁned by {tj,H j}J
j=1,
in which the marginal tax rate is tj on hours of work between Hj−1 and Hj. (See Figure
3).
Proposition 7 The deadweight loss from imposing the nonproportional tax schedule {tj,H j}J
j=1
on an agent with possibly nonconvex preferences U(C,L),w h i c hm a yb er e p r e s e n t e di nt h e




equals the deadweight loss from imposing
the nonproportional tax schedule {tj,H j}J
j=1 on an agent with underlying preferences b U(C,L)
and possibly nonconvex observable preferences b b U(O,h)=b U(O−F1(h),H−F2 (h)−h),w h e r e
U(a,b)=b b U(a,b).
Proof. See Appendix B.
19Figure 3: Nonlinear Budget Constraint
20Figure 4: Graphical Demonstration of Proposition 7 - Nonconvex Inherent Preferences
For a graphical example of this proposition, see Figures 4 and 5. The argument is very
similar to that in the previous proposition.
Thus, even in the presence of nonproportional taxation, given estimates of observable
preferences, we can proceed to calculate deadweight loss as if the observable preferences are
comprised only of underlying preferences, because the deadweight loss is the same whether
or not the observable preferences subsume work costs within.
The intuition behind the previous two results is straightforward. As was noted above,
the tax distortion on the consumption-leisure choice is unaﬀected by the source of the shape
of the indiﬀerence curve, so long as the items that inﬂuence that shape of the indiﬀerence
curves (the monetary and time costs of work) are not treated diﬀerently in tax law.
Further, it should be noted that these propositions also hold if some work costs are
observable and accounted for in the budget constraint, and other work costs are unobservable
and subsumed into estimated preferences. In addition, these propositions not only hold for
linear and piecewise linear budget constraints, but also for an arbitrarily shaped continuous
budget constraint. Finally, a similar proposition applies to goods or activities other than
labor supply, when the consumption of such a good or activity involves the expenditure of
time and/or money. Proofs of these claims are presented in Appendix C.
Thus, the question becomes whether the costs of work are actually treated diﬀerently by
tax law. Clearly, time costs of work are not aﬀected by tax law. Since we believe time
costs outside of the workplace are the main work costs, our results should largely apply.
Money costs of work are more likely to be deductible, particularly child care costs. In such
21Figure 5: Graphical Demonstration of Proposition 7 - Nonconvex Observable Preferences
situations, our DWL propositions are less applicable. However, child care costs are often
not deductible in the U.S. Furthermore, in the U.S. and elsewhere the regular costs of travel
to or from work are not deductible. Overall, given the preponderance of time costs of work,
most work costs are not likely to be diﬀerentially treated under tax systems, and the above
propositions should be largely applicable.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we critique the manner in which work costs have been incorporated into
structural labor supply models. We then show that, even if one does not think a priori that
underlying preferences are nonconvex, if one ignores the costs of work in the formulation of
a structural labor supply estimation approach, then the estimation method must contend
with the fact that work cost functions will be incorporated into observable preferences. We
then show that the incorporation of the work cost functions into observable preferences will
likely yield preferences that are nonconvex.
Since a realistic explicit incorporation of the costs of work is often infeasible in structural
labor supply estimation, this result implies that one should be wary of making the assumption
that preferences are convex when estimating labor supply parameters. The result further
provides a rationale for the contention in Heim and Meyer (2002) that a possible reason
for the perplexing ﬁndings in the literature that estimated labor supply functions violated
22basic economic assumptions is that previous estimation methods were being used on data
generated by individuals with nonconvex (or observably nonconvex preferences), which is
contrary to the assumed data generating process.
We then show that once work costs are allowed to be subsumed into observable prefer-
ences, joint identiﬁcation of the work costs and utility functions is not possible if we only make
plausible assumptions about the shapes of the utility and work cost functions. Although
the inability to jointly identify the utility and costs of work functions, absent functional
form assumptions, means that estimates of these preferences cannot be used to simulate the
eﬀects of some policies, we show they can be used to simulate the labor supply eﬀects of
changes in tax policy if work costs remain unchanged, or to estimate the deadweight loss of
t h ei n c o m et a x .
Whether estimated preferences are actually nonconvex, of course, is an empirical issue.
This paper, however, provides a theoretical rationale as to why researchers should use esti-
mation methods in which estimated parameters may represent nonconvex preferences, and
provides guidance about the policy analyses that may safely be performed with such para-
meters.
7 Appendix A - Generalization of Behavioral Model
In the setup of the consumers problem in Section 3, the assumption was implicitly made
that monetary and time work costs were exogenously given and denoted by F1 (h) and
F2 (h), respectively. In this section, we show that the results in this section may, with slight
changes, be adapted to a more general setting in which an individual’s work cost functions
are not exogenously given, but rather are the result of the individual optimizing over all of
their possible choices of transportation to work, child care, and so on. Once this change is
made, generalizations of the other propositions in the paper follow.
So, suppose that individuals have various modes by which their transportation to work,
child care, work clothing, and so on could be satisﬁed. Number these modes m =1 ,2,...,M.
Corresponding to each of these modes are the money cost of working h hours, Fm
1 (h),a n d
t h et i m ec o s to fw o r k i n gh hours, Fm
2 (h), and some other characteristics Xm. For example,
considering transportation, the individual could drive, ride a bike, take a train, take a bus,
carpool with others, and so on, and corresponding to each of these options are the time and
money involved in transportation to work so that the individual could work h hours, and
some additional characteristics, such as comfort, convenience of schedules, etc.
7.1 No preference over mode characteristics
Suppose initially that the individual only cares about the time and money associated with






1 (h) ≤ f (W,Y,h,θ)
L + h + F
m
2 (h) ≤ H.
23So, the individual chooses the time and budget constraints subject to which they maximize
their utility. The optimal choice will consist of a mode m, and the optimal h, L,a n dC that
maximize utility subject to the budget and time constraints corresponding to mode m.W e












s.t.O ≤ f (W,Y,h,θ).
Writing it this way, the individual chooses the function they maximize subject to the same
constraint, and the optimal choice will consist of a mode m and the optimal h and O that
maximize the objective function corresponding to mode m subject to the constraint.
This can be further rewritten in two parts, the ﬁrst of which is














Here, m(O,h) is a policy function which denotes the optimal choice of mode given that the
individual will spend outlays in the amount of O and will work h hours. This function, given













s.t.O ≤ f (W, Y,h,θ).
If we let F1 (O,h)=F
m(O,h)
1 (h) and F2 (O,h)=F
m(O,h)





O − F1 (O,h),H − h + F2 (O,h)
¢
(34)
s.t.O ≤ f (W,Y,h,θ),
which is the same as (4), with the exception that the work cost functions are now functions
o fo u t l a y sa sw e l la sh o u r s . L e t t i n g
e U (O,h)=U
¡
O − F1 (O,h),H − h + F2 (O,h)
¢
(35)
yields a result analogous to that in Section 3.
Generalizations of the preference shape propositions in Section 4 to this setting are
straightforward. Further, since the observable preferences in this case are still not a function
of tax parameters, generalizations of the policy analysis and deadweight loss propositions in
Section 5 will also still hold.
7.2 Preference over mode characteristics
Suppose now that individuals have preferences over the characteristics of each mode, so that






1 (h) ≤ f (W, Y,h,θ)
L + h + F
m
2 (h) ≤ H












s.t.O ≤ f (W, Y,h, θ).
This can again be considered in a two stage frame work, the ﬁrst of which is














Again, m(O,h) is a policy function, which denotes the optimal choice of mode given the
characteristics of each mode, and given that the individual spends outlays, O,a n dw o r k s












s.t.O ≤ f (W,Y,h,θ).
If we let F1 (O,h)=F
m(O,h)
1 (h) and F2 (O,h)=F
m(O,h)





O − F1 (O,h),H − h + F2 (O,h),X m(O,h)
¢
(40)
s.t.O ≤ f (W, Y,h, θ).
Letting e U (O,h)=U
¡
O − F1 (O,h),H − h + F2 (O,h),X m(O,h)
¢
yields a result analogous
to that in Section 3.
Again, generalizations of the preference shape propositions in Section 4 to this setting
a r es t r a i g h t f o r w a r d . A l s o ,t h eo b s e r v a b l ep r e f e r e n c e sa r eo n c ea g a i nn o taf u n c t i o no ft a x
parameters, and so generalizations of the policy analysis and deadweight loss propositions
in Section 5 will once again still hold.
8 Appendix B - Proofs of Deadweight Loss Proposi-
tions
In this appendix, we present proofs of the deadweight loss propositions in Section 5.
Proposition 6. The deadweight loss from imposing a proportional tax, t, on an individ-
ual with possibly nonconvex preferences U(C,L), which may be represented in the absence of




equals the deadweight loss from imposing a propor-
tional tax, t, on an individual with underlying preferences b U(C,L) and possibly nonconvex






0)=a r gm a x
C,L
©
U(C,L):C ≤ (1 − t)Wh+ Y,h = H − L
ª
, (41)
25where W is the gross wage, Y is nonlabor income, and the price of consumption is normalized





0)=a r gm a x
C,h
n













Using the duality between the utility maximization problem and the expenditure minimiza-
tion problem, we have the value of the expenditure function evaluated at u0,
e((1 − t)W,u0)=C
∗




(e C0, e L0)=a r gm i n
C,L
©
C − Wh: U(C,L) ≥ u0,h= H − L
ª
, (45)
which has an equivalent formulation as
(e C0,e h0)=a r gm i n
C,h
n
C − Wh: U(C,h) ≥ u0
o
. (46)
Clearly, by the deﬁnition of the expenditure function,
e(W, u0)=e C0 − We h0. (47)




By the deﬁnition of deadweight loss,
DWL0 = e((1 − t)W,u0) − e(W, u0) − R0. (49)
Substituting (44), (47), and (48) into (49) yields
DWL0 =[ C
∗
















1)=a r gm a x
C,L,h
½ b U(C,L):C ≤ (1 − t)Wh+ Y − F1(h),
L = H − F2 (h) − h
¾
. (51)
For reference, see Figure 2. Letting u1 = b U(C∗
1,L ∗









T oe v a l u a t et h i sq u a n t i t y ,n o t et h a tw ec a nu s eO = C + F1(h)= ⇒ C = O − F1(h) to write





1)=a r gm a x
O,h
n
b U(O − F1(h),H − F2 (h) − h):O ≤ (1 − t)Wh+ Y
o
, (53)





1)=a r gm a x
O,h
½
b b U(O,h):O ≤ (1 − t)Wh+ Y
¾
. (54)




0. Using these equalities, along
with the property that C∗
1 = O∗
1 − F1(h∗
1), yields that (52) is equal to
e((1 − t)W,u1)=C
∗




(e C1, e L1,e h1)=a r gm i n
C,L,h
n
C − Wh+ F1(h):b U(C,L) ≥ u1,L= H − F2 (h) − h
o
. (56)
By the deﬁnition of the expenditure function, we have
e(W,u1)=e C1 + F1(e h1) − We h1. (57)
Note, however, that since











1 − F2 (h
∗
1))










and using C = O − F1 (h), (56) may be rewritten
(e O1,e h1)=a r gm i n
O,h
n
O − Wh: b U(O − F1(h),H − F2 (h) − h) ≥ u0
o
, (59)
which, by the deﬁnition of b b U(O,h), becomes
(e O1,e h1)=a r gm i n
O,h
½
O − Wh: b b U(O,h) ≥ u0
¾
. (60)
Since U(a,b)=b b U(a,b),i ti sc l e a rt h a te O1 = e C0 and e h1 = e h0.U s i n g e C1 = e O1 − F1(e h1),
these equalities yield that (57) is equal to
e(W, u1)=e C0 − We h0. (61)











DWL1 = e((1 − t)W,u1) − e(W, u1) − R1. (64)
Substituting (55), (61), and (63) into (64), and comparing with (50) yields the result.
Proposition 7. The deadweight loss from imposing the nonproportional tax schedule
{tj,H j}J
j=1 on an agent with possibly nonconvex preferences U(C,L),w h i c hm a yb er e p r e -




equals the deadweight loss
from imposing the progressive tax schedule {tj,H j}J
j=1 on an agent with underlying prefer-
ences b U(C,L) and possibly nonconvex observable preferences b b U(O,h)=b U(O − F1(h),H −
F2 (h) − h),w h e r eU(a,b)=b b U(a,b).





0)=a r gm a x
C,L

    
    
U(C,L):






(1 − tj)W(h − Hj−1)
+
Pj−1
k=1(1 − tk)W(Hk − Hk−1)
¸
×1(Hj−1 ≤ h<H j)

,
h = H − L

    
    
, (65)
where W is the gross wage, Y is nonlabor income, H i st h et i m ee n d o w m e n t ,a n dt h ep r i c e


















(1 − tj)W(h − Hj−1)
+
Pj−1
k=1(1 − tk)W(Hk − Hk−1)
¸

















Using the duality between the utility maximization problem and the expenditure minimiza-






















(e C0, e L0)=a r gm i n
C,L
©
C − Wh: U(C,L) ≥ u0,h= H − L
ª
, (69)
which also has an equivalent formulation as
(e C0,e h0)=a r gm i n
C,h
n
C − Wh: U(C,h) ≥ u0
o
. (70)
Clearly, by the deﬁnition of the expenditure function,
e(W, u0)=e C0 − We h0. (71)













0 <H j). (72)
By the deﬁnition of deadweight loss,
DWL0 = e({(1 − tj)W}
J
j=1,u 0) − e(W, u0) − R0. (73)














































1)=a r gm a x
C,L,h

    
    







(1 − tj)W(h − Hj−1)
+
Pj−1
k=1 (1 − tk)W(Hk−Hk−1)
¸
×1(Hj−1≤ h<H j) − F1(h)

,
L = H − F2 (h) − h

    
    
. (75)
For reference, see Figure 5. Letting u1 = b U (C∗
1,L ∗
























T oe v a l u a t et h i sq u a n t i t y ,n o t et h a tw ec a nu s eO = C + F1(h)= ⇒ C = O − F1(h) to write










b U(O − F1(h),H − F2 (h) − h):






(1 − tj)W (h − Hj−1)
+
Pj−1
k=1(1 − tk)W(Hk − Hk−1)
¸












1)=a r gm a x
O,h

   
   
b b U(O,h):






(1 − tj)W(h − Hj−1)
+
Pj−1
k=1(1 − tk)W(Hk − Hk−1)
¸




   
   
. (78)




0. Using these equalities, along
with the property that C∗
1 = O∗
1 − F1(h∗






















(e C1, e L1,e h1)=a r gm i n
C,L,h
n
C − Wh+ F1(h):b U(C,L) ≥ u1,L= H − F2 (h) − h
o
. (80)
Then, by the deﬁnition of the expenditure function, we have
e(W,u1)=e C1 + F1(e h1) − We h1. (81)
Note, however, that since
























and using C = O − F1 (h), (80) may be rewritten
(e O1,e h1)=a r gm i n
O,h
n
O − Wh: b U(O − F1 (h),H − F2 (h) − h) ≥ u0
o
, (83)
which, by the deﬁnition of b b U (O,h),b e c o m e s
(e O1,e h1)=a r gm i n
O,h
½
O − Wh: b b U(O,h) ≥ u0
¾
. (84)
Since U(a,b)=b b U(a,b), it is clear that e O1 = e C0,a n de h1 = e h0.U s i n g e C1 = e O1 − F1(e h1),
these equalities imply that (81) is equal to
e(W, u1)=e C0 − We h0. (85)













1 <H j), (86)
which, since h∗
1 = h∗













0 <H j). (87)
In this case,
DWL1 = e({(1 − tj)W}
J
j=1,u 1) − e(W, u1) − R1. (88)
Substitution of (79), (85), and (63) into (88), and comparing with (74) yields the result.
309 Appendix C - Generalizations of Deadweight Loss
Propositions
In this appendix, we present proofs of some generalizations of the main deadweight loss
equivalence propositions.
9.1 Arbitrary Budget Constraint
The following proposition demonstrates the deadweight loss equivalence for an arbitrary
budget constraint.
Proposition 8 The deadweight loss from imposing the nonproportional tax schedule f(W,Y,h,θ)
on an agent with possibly nonconvex preferences U(C,L), which may be represented in the ab-




, equals the deadweight loss from imposing
this same tax schedule on an agent with underlying preferences b U(C,L) and unobservable
m o n e t a r ya n dt i m ew o r kc o s t s ,F1 (h) and F2 (h), yielding possibly nonconvex observable
preferences b b U(O,h)=b U(O − F1(h),H − F2 (h) − h),w h e r eU(a,b)=b b U(a,b).





0)=a r gm a x
C,L
©
U(C,L):C ≤ f(W,Y,h,θ),h= H − L
ª
, (89)
where W is the gross wage, Y is nonlabor income, θ are tax parameters, f(W,Y,h,θ) is
the after tax income from working h hours, H is the time endowment, and the price of





0)=a r gm a x
C,h
n













Using the duality between the utility maximization problem and the expenditure minimiza-
tion problem, we have the value of the expenditure function evaluated at u0,
e(W,θ,u0)=Y. (92)
Now, let
(e C0, e L0)=a r gm i n
C,L
©
C − Wh: U(C,L) ≥ u0,h= H − L
ª
, (93)
which also has an equivalent formulation as
(e C0,e h0)=a r gm i n
C,h
n
C − Wh: U(C,h) ≥ u0
o
. (94)
Clearly, by the deﬁnition of the expenditure function,
e(W, u0)=e C0 − We h0. (95)
31Finally, let the taxes collected by the government be characterized by R0,w h e r e





By the deﬁnition of deadweight loss,
DWL0 = e(W,θ,u0) − e(W,u0) − R0. (97)
Substitution of (92), (95) and (96) into (97) yields
DWL0 = Y −
h






























C ≤ f(W,Y,h,θ) − F1 (h),





To evaluate these quantities, note that we can substitute in the time constraint, and use





1)=a r gm a x
O,h
½









1)=a r gm a x
O,h
½
b b U(O,h):O ≤ f(W,Y,h,θ)
¾
. (101)





Letting u1 = U (C∗
1,L ∗
1), again using the duality between the utility maximization problem




(e C1, e L1,e h1)=a r gm i n
C,L,h
n
C + F1(h) − Wh: b U(C,L) ≥ u1,L= H − F2 (h) − h
o
. (103)
Then, by the deﬁnition of the expenditure function, we have
e(W,u1)=e C1 + F1(e h1) − We h1. (104)
Note, however, that since
























32and using C = O − F1 (h), (103) may be rewritten
(e O1,e h1)=a r gm i n
O,h
n
O − Wh: b U(O − F1 (h),H − F2 (h) − h) ≥ u0
o
, (106)
which, by the deﬁnition of b b U (O,h),b e c o m e s
(e O1,e h1)=a r gm i n
O,h
½
O − Wh: b b U(O,h) ≥ u0
¾
. (107)
Since U(a,b)=b b U(a,b), comparing (107) to (94), it is clear that e O1 = e C0,a n de h1 = e h0.
Using e C1 = e O1 − F1(e h1), these equalities imply that (104) is equal to
e(W, u1)=e C0 − We h0. (108)
F i n a l l y ,t h et a xr e v e n u ei s




1 − F1 (h
∗
1) (109)









0 as noted above, implies






DWL1 = e(W,θ,u1) − e(W,u1) − R1. (111)
Substitution of (102), (108), and (110) into (111), and comparing with (98) yields the result.
9.2 Work Costs Partially Observable
The following proposition demonstrates the deadweight loss equivalence when some time and
money work costs are observable, and other time and money work costs are unobservable.
Proposition 9 I nt h ep r e s e n c eo fo b s e r v a b l em o n e t a r yw o r kc o s t s ,Fo
1(h), and observable
t i m ew o r kc o s t s ,Fo
2 (h), the deadweight loss from imposing the nonproportional tax schedule
f(W,Y,h,θ) on an agent with possibly nonconvex preferences U(C,L),w h i c hm a yb er e p r e -




, equals the deadweight loss
from imposing this same tax schedule on an agent with underlying preferences b U(C,L) and
unobservable monetary and time work costs, Fu
1 (h) and Fu
2 (h), yielding possibly nonconvex
observable preferences b b U(O,h)=b U(O − Fu
1 (h),H − Fu
2 (h) − h),w h e r eU(a,b)=b b U(a,b).





0)=a r gm a x
C,L
©




2 (h)=H − L
ª
, (112)
33where W is the gross wage, Y is nonlabor income, θ are tax parameters, f(W,Y,h,θ) is
the after tax income from working h hours, H is the time endowment, and the price of





























Using the duality between the utility maximization problem and the expenditure minimiza-
tion problem, we have the value of the expenditure function evaluated at u0,
e(W,θ,u0)=Y. (115)
Now, let





1 (h) − Wh: U(C,L) ≥ u0,h+ F
o
2 (h)=H − L
ª
, (116)
which also has an equivalent formulation as





1 (h) − Wh: U(C,h + F
o
2 (h)) ≥ u0
o
. (117)
Clearly, by the deﬁnition of the expenditure function,






− We h0. (118)
Finally, let the taxes collected by the government be characterized by R0,w h e r e









By the deﬁnition of deadweight loss,
DWL0 = e(W,θ,u0) − e(W,u0) − R0. (120)
Substitution of (115), (118) and (119) into (120) yields
DWL0 = Y −
h






























C ≤ f(W, Y,h,θ) − Fo
1 (h) − Fu
1 (h),
L = H − Fu
2 (h) − Fo





To evaluate these quantities, note that we can substitute in the time constraint, and use





1)=a r gm a x
O,h
½
b U(O − Fu
1 (h),H − Fo
2 (h) − Fu
2 (h) − h):









1)=a r gm a x
O,h
½
b b U(O,h+ F
o










Letting u1 = U (C∗
1,L ∗
1), again using the duality between the utility maximization problem









1 (h) − Wh:
b U(C,L) ≥ u1,L= H − Fo
2 (h) − Fu
2 (h) − h
¾
. (126)
Then, by the deﬁnition of the expenditure function, we have




1 (e h1) − We h1. (127)
Note, however, that since








































and using C = O − Fu
1 (h), (126) may be rewritten





b U(O − Fu
1 (h),H − Fo
2 (h) − Fu
2 (h) − h) ≥ u0
¾
, (129)
which, by the deﬁnition of b b U (O,h),b e c o m e s





1(h) − Wh: b b U(O,h+ F
o
2 (h)) ≥ u0
¾
. (130)
Since U(a,b)=b b U(a,b), comparing (130) to (117), it is clear that e O1 = e C0,a n de h1 = e h0.
Using e C1 = e O1 − F1(e h1), these equalities imply that (127) is equal to
e(W,u1)=e C0 + F
0
1(e h0) − We h0. (131)
F i n a l l y ,t h et a xr e v e n u ei s


























0 as noted above, implies










DWL1 = DWL0 = e(W, θ, u1) − e(W,u1) − R0 (135)
Substitution of (125), (131), and (134) into (135), and comparing with (121) yields the result.
9.3 Application to Other Goods
In order to generalize the deadweight loss equivalence proposition to goods or activities other
than labor supply, we need to make a slight adjustment. So, suppose now that a consumer
maximizes a utility function over activity or good x, other consumption, C, and leisure,
L. Suppose further that consuming activity or good x requires inputs of time, F1 (x),a n d
money, F2 (x), in order to consume the activity or good. The consumer’s problem is then
maxU(x,C,L)
s.t. px + F1 (x)+C ≤ f(W,Y,h,θ)
L + h + F2 (x) ≤ H.
where p is the price of x, f(·) is the after tax income given gross wage, W, nonlabor income,
Y , hours of work, h, and tax parameters, θ,a n dH is the time endowment.
Subbing in the time constraint, and letting O ≡ C + F1 (x), this maximization problem
may be rewritten as
maxU(x,O − F1 (x),H − h + F2 (x))
s.t. px + O ≤ f(W,Y,h,θ)
which, deﬁning e U (x,O,h)=U(x,O − F1 (x),H − h + F2 (x)),c a nb er e w r i t t e na s
max e U (x,O,h)
s.t. px + O ≤ f(W,Y,h,θ)
Given this setup, the following proposition, which is analogous to Proposition 8, but con-
cerning the equivalence of deadweight loss due to a tax on the consumption of good x,w i l l
hold.
Proposition 10 The deadweight loss from an arbitrary income tax schedule f(W,Y,h,θ)
and a tax t on the consumption of good x on an agent with possibly nonconvex preferences
U(x,C,L), which may be represented in the absence of time and money inputs to the con-




equals the deadweight loss from imposing the same
taxes on an agent with underlying preferences b U(x,C,L) and possibly nonconvex observable
preferences b b U(x,O,h)=b U(O − F1(x),H − F2 (x) − h),w h e r eU(a,b,c)=b b U(a,b,c).













(1 + t)px + C ≤ f(W,Y,h,θ),





where W is the gross wage, Y is nonlabor income, θ are tax parameters, H is the time
endowment, the price of good x is p, and the price of consumption is normalized to 1.T h i s



























Using the duality between the utility maximization problem and the expenditure minimiza-
tion problem, we have the value of the expenditure function evaluated at u0,
e((1 + t)p,θ,u0)=Y. (139)
Now, let
(e x0, e C0, e L0)=a r gm i n
x,C,L
©
px + C − Wh: U(x,C,L) ≥ u0,h= H − L
ª
, (140)
which also has an equivalent formulation as
(e x0, e C0,e h0)=a r gm i n
x,C,h
n
px + C − Wh: U(x,C,h) ≥ u0
o
. (141)
Clearly, by the deﬁnition of the expenditure function,
e(p,Wh + Y,u0)=pe x0 + e C0 − We h0. (142)
Finally, let the taxes collected by the government be characterized by R0,w h e r e
R0 = Wh
∗





By the deﬁnition of deadweight loss,
DWL0 = e((1 + t)p,θ,u0) − e(p,Wh + Y,u0) − R0. (144)
Substitution of (139), (142) and (143) into (144) yields
DWL0 = Y −
h
























(1 + t)px + C ≤ f (W,Y,h,θ) − F1(x),





37To evaluate these quantities, note that we can use O = C + F1(x)= ⇒ C = O − F1(x) and







1)=a r gm a x
x,O,h
½
b U(O − F1(x),H − F2 (x) − h):
(1 + t)px + O ≤ f (W,Y,h,θ)
¾
, (147)







1)=a r gm a x
x,O,h
½
b b U(x,O,h):( 1+t)px + O ≤ f (W, Y,h, θ)
¾
. (148)







u1 = b U (x∗
1,C∗
1,L ∗
1),b yd e ﬁnition of the expenditure function, we have
e((1 + t)p,θ,u1)=Y. (149)
Now, let
(e x1, e C1, e L1,e h1)=a r g m i n
x,C,L,h
½
px + C − Wh+ F1(x):
b U(x,C,L) ≥ u1,L= H − F2 (x) − h
¾
. (150)
Then, by the deﬁnition of the expenditure function, we have
e(p,Wh + Y,u1)=pe x1 + e C1 + F1(e x1) − We h1. (151)
Note, however, that since
































and using C = O − F1 (x), (150) may be rewritten
(e x1, e O1,e h1)=a r gm i n
x,O,h
n
px + O − Wh: b U(x,O − F1 (x),H − F2 (x) − h) ≥ u0
o
, (153)
which, by the deﬁnition of b b U (x,O,h), becomes
(e x1, e O1,e h1)=a r gm i n
x,O,h
½
px + O − Wh: b b U(x,O,h) ≥ u0
¾
. (154)
Since U(a,b,c)=b b U(a,b,c), it is clear that e x1 = e x0, e O1 = e C0,a n de h1 = e h0.U s i n g
e C1 = e O1 − F1(e x1), these equalities imply that (151) is equal to
e(p,Wh + Y,u1)=pe x0 + e C0 − We h0. (155)
38F i n a l l y ,t h et a xr e v e n u ei s
R1 = Y + Wh
∗









0, as noted above, implies
R1 = Y + Wh
∗






DWL1 = e((1 + t)p,θ,u1) − e(p,Wh + Y,u1) − R1. (158)
Substitution of (149), (155), and (157) into (158), and comparing with (145) yields the result.
Thus, this proposition demonstrates that in order to calculate the deadweight loss of a
on the consumption of good or activity x,w ed on o tn e e dt ok n o wt h ef o r mo ft h et i m ea n d
money costs functions, but rather can simply estimate preferences over good x, labor supply
h,a n do u t l a y sO, and calculate the deadweight loss using these.
For an example of a good to which this proposition would apply, consider the case of
golﬁng. The price of a round of golf is easily observable, but the amount of time it takes
is not. In addition, there are some ﬁxed costs to playing golf (buying clubs), and also
some marginal costs (replacing broken clubs, replacing balls that are lost, drinks while on
the course) that diﬀer depending on how many games are played. This proposition states
that, given that one has estimated observable preferences over golf games, hours of work,
and other consumption, one could calculate the deadweight loss of a tax on golf without
knowing the explicit form of the time and money costs that are involved in playing golf.
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